Compounding financial repression with rigid urban regulations : lessons of the Korea housing market (English) by Renaud, Bertrand & INU
10 iS C)
THE WORLD BANK
POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH STAFF
Infrastructure and Urban Development Department
Report INU 21
Compounding Financial Repression With
Rigid Urban Regulations:
Lessons of the Korea Housing Market
By Bertrand Renaud
Junelg98 G
Discussion Paper
This Is a document published informally by the World Bank. The views and interpretatons herein are those cf the author and
should not be attributed to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, orto any ndividual acting on their behalf.
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Copvright 1988
Th Vrd Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
All Rights Reserved
First Printing June 1988
This is a document published Infbrmally by the Worid Bank. In order that the information contained in
it can be presented with the least possible delay, the typescript has not been prepared in accordance with the
procedures appropriate to formal printed texts, and the World Bank accepts no responsibility for errors.
The World Bank does not accept responsibility for the views expressed herein, which are those of the
author and should not be atributed to the Worid Bank or to its affiliated organizations. The findings, interpretations,
and conclusions are the results of research supported by the Bank- they do not necessarily represent official policy
oi the Bank. The designations employed, the presentation of r- rial, and any maps used in this document are
solely for the convenience of the reader and do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of
the Wond Bank or its affiliates conceming the legal status of any country, territory, city, area, or of its authorities, or
concerning the delimitations of its boundaries or national affiliation.
Bertrand Renaud is Housing Finance Advisor, from the Infrastructure and Urban Development
Department of the World Bank. This paper is a revision of an earlier version presented at the 10th Pacific Regional
Science Conference in Pusan, Korea, in July 1987 under the title "Housing Finance in Financially Repressed
Economies: Lessons of the Korean Experience." Some key points made in the original paper have been
considerably enhanced by new empirical economic results on Korea that Kyung-Hwan Kim presented at the same
conference. The author is grateful to an anonymous referee for his suggestions and to Robert Buckley for his early
comments.
This paper is scheduled to appear in the introductory issue of the REVIEW OF URBAN AND
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, Tokyo, Japan.
COMPOUNDING FINANCIAL REPRESSION 'WITH RIGID URBAN REGULATIONS:
Lessons of the Korea Housing Market
ABSTRACY
The impact of financial policies on the urban sector through
their effect on household investment behavior is too easily ignored.
This paper explcres the interactions between financial and urban
policies, and their joint impact on the performance of the housing
sector during the course of economic development. The central
hypothesis is that extended periods of financial repression and the
scarcity of mortgage lending have generated significant distortions in
the output of the Korean housing sector. In addition, combined with
very restrictive urban planning and land use regulations, this financial
situation may have led to under-investment in the urbea sector of Korea
during much of the past two decades. A broader question is whether such
distortions and under-investment have been an integral component of the
rapid growth policies of other East Asian Larket economies such as Japan
and Taiwan, or what differences there might be.
The analysis in the paper progresses from economic growth
policies and directed credit to urban outcomes, the key link is the
behavior of Korean households. Policies of directed credit have aimed
to accelerate economic growth. However, inflation can quickly transform
such policies into financial repression which affects household savings
behavior. Contrary to the very intent of policy makers, are household
savings driven into the real estate market by financial repression
thereby accelerating the rate of appreciation of housing? What kind of
economic indicator might one want to use to gauge the extent of
investment distortions over uime and track policy improvements? Do
urban policies which aim at orderly physical planning and the protection
of scarce farm land compound problems? Can we find evidence that
intersectoral investment allocation between the housing sector and other
sectors has been distorted against housing? Could different financial
policies lead to better outcomes not only for housing but for the rest
of the economy?
The evidence is that there has been under-investment in
housing in Korea. However, this does not mean that urbanization in
Korea has taken place in a particularly bad way. The urban performance
of Korea remains remarkable: it has absorbed large "opulations quickly
and at improving standards. Is under-investment in .he urban sector the
price to be paid for achieving high growth rates? This paper could only
raise the issue. An analysis of overall national economic growth is
needed to determine what alternative intersectoral allucation patterns
might have been feasible and maintain East Asian style high growth.
Asian cross-country comparisons should also be valuable. On the other
hand, there is no doubt that financial stability and an efficient
mortgage finance system will greatly improve the inter-sectoral.
allocation of resources and achieve greater equity. The present period
constitutes an important transition for the Korean housing finance
system.
The World Bank
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Rigid Urban Regulations:
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. The objective of this paper is to explore the interactions
between financial and urban policies, and their joint impact on the
performance of the housing sector during the course of economic
development. The central hypothesis is that extended periods of
financial repression and the scarcity of mortgage lending have generated
significant distortions in the output of the Korean housing sector. In
addition, combined with very restrictive urban planning and land use
regulations, this financial situation may have led to under-investment
in the urban sector of Korea during much of the past two decades. A
broader question which is left unaddressed is whether such distortions
and under-investment have been an integral component of the rapid growth
policies ol other East Asian market economies such as Japan and Taiwan,
or what differences there might be.
2. The original impetus for thinking that financial policies have
as much to do with urban outcomes as physical conditions or even income
levels came from comparing housing markets operating under different
policies and institutions. For instance, why would France which enjoys
the largest land area in Europe have higher housing costs and smaller
units than Holland which reclaims lar,d from the sea? In Asia, what
could be the role of financial policy regimes in two of the most primate
cities of Asia: Seoul and Bangkok. During the 1970s and early 1980s
both cities were growing rapidly. However, their housing markets were
operating in contrasting ways. Seoul had repressive financial policies
and skyrocketing real estate values while Bangkok grew rapidly with
moderate rises in housing prices under much less interventionist
financial policies.
3. Data collected during the preparation of housing projects in
Thailand and Korea were showing thit Thai rates of real estate
appreciation were quite moderate in spite the rapid demographic growth
of Bangkok and significant per capita income gains. As recently
reported for Bangkok: "'.asidential land prices as a whole have been
increasing in real terms at the moderate rate of 6-10 percent per annum
in recent years, faster than incomes. The long-term increases (1971-
1986) appear to have been lower (3 percent percent per annum adjusting
for inflation and location). In comparison to 1971, land in land-and-
house and land subdivision projects has now become more affordable",
1/ See PADCO, Bangkok Land Management Study (1988), Executive Summary
paragraph 36.
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For Korea, the speed of real estate appreciation was x map uive 14
percent compounded real rite during the period 1963-1974.2' This trend
continued until the early 1980s.
4. An analysis of Korea is interesting for several reasons.
First, T -ea's growth strategy relied on strong directed credit policies
which ur.6er inflation led to financial repression over significant
periods uf time. It is therefore an important c.dse of housing market
expansion under financial repression. Second, Korea has so far been the
fastest urbanizing economy with an urban population share of 28 percent
in 1960 and 68 percent by now. It moved from low income housing markets
with per capita incomes of about $100 in the early 1960s to middle
income housing markets with an income of $2,800 in 1987. In Korea
changes are likely t^ be easily visible. A financial perspective
should throw new light on long-standing Korean riddles such as: the
existence of the chonsei or "key money" system of renting; the skewed
size-distribution f housing output, the continuing decline of the ratio
of housing units to households in spite of rapid household income gains;
the contrast between the problems created by "hot money" and real estate
speculation during the 1970s with the so-called real estate market
"slump" which followed macro-economic structural adjustment policies.
5. The analysis in the paper progresses from economic growth
policies and directed credit to urban outcomes, the key link is the
behavior of Korean households. Policies of directed credit have aimed
to accelerate conomic growth. However, inflation can quickly transform
such polif'es into financial repression which affects household savings
behavior._ Contrary to the very intent of policy makers, are household
savings driven into the real estate market by financial repression
thereby accelerating the rate of appreciation of housing? What kind of
economic indicator might one want to use to gauge the extent of
investment distortions over time and track policy improvements? Do
urban policies which aim at orderly physical planning and the protection
of scarce farm land compound problems? Can we find evidence that
intersectoral investment allocation between the housing sector and other
sectors has been distorted against housing? Could different financial
2/ See Mills and Song (1977), p. 104.
3/ The terms "financial restriction" and "financial repression" are
used by financial development economists to characterize financial
market conditions. Under "financial restriction" financial
regulations aim to steer domestic savings into preferred
activities under a low interest policy. Under "financial
repression" regulated interest on deposits in financial
institutions fall below inflation and become negative. A
repressive policy can be seen as a restrictive policy gone wrong.
See Maxwell Fry (1988).
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policies lead to better outcomes not only for housing but for the rest
of the economy?
II. HIGH GROWTH POLICY, INFLATION AND "FINANCIAL RIPRESSION"
A. Role of Directed Credit Policies in High Growth Strategies
6. The aim being to achieve high growth rates and to catch up
with the most advanced economies, directed credit policies have
dominated the thinking of economic planners over the last forty years.
This approach evolved under low and stable world inflation, steadily
growing international trade and exchange rates determined by the Bretton
Woods international agreements.
7. The rationale for directed credit is that government should
play the key role in development in order to accelerate growth; it can
do this best by playing an active and direct role in the allocation of
credit to "strategic" or "priority" sectors. Therefore, financial
regulators encourage institutions and financial instruments from which
governments can collect resources for public uses while discouraging
others. The desired effect is to increase the flow of domestic
resources to the public, sector without triggering a rise in inflation
and in interest rates.- It must also be recalled that, in countries
where institutional development is limited, the two most accessible tax
bases are the financial and the trade sectors.
8. The methods of policy implementation have tended to be similar
from country to country. They include favoring the commercial banking
system while restricting or suppressing private bond and equity
markets. This could be done directly through transaction taxes, stamp
duties, special tax rates on income from capital, as well as unfavorable
legal and regulatory frameworks. It could also be done indirectly with
the low interest charged to preferred investors. Then governments
impose high reserve requirements and rely on the obligatory holding of
government bonds to tap savings at low interest rates or zero cost to
4/ For a good description of one such successful approach and its
eventual demise in Japan see: "Historical Developments and
Resultant Conflicts in the Financial System", Chapter 1 in Yoshio
Suzuki (1986). Additional analyses are also found in an earlier
boo;k by the same author (1980). In Western Europe, French
economic planning also relied on directed credit. For recent
critical evaluations of French financial policies of directed
credit see Denis Kessler and Banque de France. Policies of
financial liberalization have been accelerating in France since
the early 1980s.
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the public sector. The imposition of interest rate ceilings also
indirectly helps reduce competition from the private suppliers of
credit.
9. Rather than letting banking interest rates reflect the real
cost of capital and subsiJizing the cost of borrowing, planners have set
interest rates by fiat. The reference to the return to savers or the
resource cost of implicit transfers often became lost during the 1970s
when inflation accelerated. Under such policies, the pricing and
allocation of financial risks has been suppressed; but the risks
remained. The outcomes of such financial sector "repression" of
interest rates include a dual interest/ rate structure between financial
institutions and unregulated markets.-
B. Financial Repression and Common Symptoms of
Von-Performing Housing Finance Systems
10. Strong policies of directed credit emphasizing "priority
sectors" can lead to problems in the housing sector, especially under
inflation and fluctuating interest rates. Based on a recent review of
the experience of a cross-section of countries in Asia, Latin America
and the Middj7-East, frequent symptoms of non-performing housing finance
systems are:-
(a) Low and stagnating share of household financial assets in
total savings, even when the share of real savings in GDP
rises.
(b) Poor profitability of financial institutions.
(c) Dual interest rate structure and large unregulated
sector.
(d) Low level of financial intermediation in the housing
sector including: very small supply of mortgages,
mortgage credit at controlled rates for a limited
clientele, inforfral construction. Inappropriate
financing policies zutting access to institutional
5/ Such a dual interest rate structure is well documented by Suzuki
(1986) in the case of Japan. Among developing countries, some of
the most extensive studies have been done for Korea see Yung-Chul
Park (1976) and David C. Cole and Yung-Chul Park (1983, Chapters
4 and 5). For a more comprehensive macro-economic analysis of
Korea, see Sweder van Wijnbergen (1981) and (1983). The most
recent and complete analysis of these issues is Fry (1988).
6/ See Renaud and Buckley (1987), especially Chapter 3.
financing may be reinforced by non-financial policy
constraints (land use controls, rent control, excessively
costly or inappropriate building codes).
(e) Highly cyclical housing output strongly influenced by
monetary liquidity in the economy and realized capital
gains.
(f) Skewed size-distribution of housing output with so-called
"speculatiue over-investment" by high income groups and
over-crowding at the bottom.
(g) Rising ratio of households -. lumber of units.
(h) Rapidly rising real rents in ;he rental markets.
(i) Because of financial repression long-term markets
disappear. Govearnments then resort to the creation of
non-market mechanisms to generate long-term funds for
housing (tax funds, compulsory bank lending, housing
mandated on employers, etc...). An additional layer of
urban investment distortion is thus added to the
financial system. The underlying national risks hidden
behind such practices is a function of tile gap between
controlled rates used in such funds compared to the
actual opportunity cost of capital in the economy. In
Latin America the distortions have been quite severe,
less so in Asia.
11. Such symptoms of non-performing housing finance systems are
"stylized facts". They emerge when financial repression continues for
significant periods of time. Because the financial economy adjusts
faster than the real economy, these symptoms of repression vary in
intensity across countries, and in the same country over different
periods of time.
12. Korea has experienced significant periods of financial
repression. The basic pattern of interest rates between 1960 and 1986
presented in Table 1 shows that financial repression has been
particularly intense in the 1970s. The period of major financial
reforms and interest rate liberalization of 1965-69 led to a rapid
expansion the financial system; it was when the Korea Housing Bank
was crs4teb. This phase is often mentioned as a successful example of
financ ,' liberalization with high and positive real rates mobilizing
financi&l savings effectively. However positive real rates did not last
and financial repression coincided with the most massive phase of
urbanization in Korean history. The responsiveness of financial sector
- 6 -
growth to real interest rates is very clear when compariri, Table 1 and
Figure 1 which shows the ratio of M2 to GNP over 25 years._
13. Comparing levels of financial development in Korea, Thailand
and Japan, Figure 2 shows that Thailand achieved a higher level of
financial level development throughout the entire period due to
considerably less government intervention in the financial markets. The
depth of Thai financial development measured by the ratio of M2 to GNP
is greater than in Korea in spite of a per capita income that was at
first half and then soon only one-third of Korea's.
Table 1: REAL DEPOSIT RATES IN KOREA, 1960-1986
Period Deposits Rate
1960-64 -6.7%
1965-69 26.9%
1970 1.8%
1971 -2.0%
1972 5.0%
19.3 -19.1%
1974 -15.8%
1975 0.6%
1976 1.5%
1977 -6.4%
1978 -8.8%
1979 -16.3%
1980 -0.4%
1981 7.0%
1982 4*0%
1983 1.3%
1984 5.3%
1985 5.8%
1986 7.7%
Sources: Hanson and Neal (1985) and Dornbush and Park (1987). Their
calculations were based on official statistics. See also Figures
4 and 5 which are directly based on the original sources.
7/ M is one of the simplest if imperfect measure of the willingness
the public to maintain time and savings deposits with financial
institutions. M2 over GNP is very convenient to compare different
countries and follow changes over Lime.
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Figure 1
KOREA: FINANCIkL DEEPENING
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III. THE HOUSEHOLD RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL REPRESSION
14. A major and direct link between financial policies and urban
investment is through the behavior of households and their desire to
accumulate wealth. In developed economies where housing finance is
available, housing provides the dominant saving instrument for most
families. Saving takes place in three ways: in the form of prior
savings for down-payments, through the amortization of outstanding loans
as well as through capital gains. The higher the expectation of capital
gains the smaller the other two forms of savings are likely to be.
15. The place of housing in household savings is expected to be
much larger in developing countries. The situation prevails because the
return on housing is not reduced by interest rate ceilings as are the
returns on many forms of financial savings. Housing values keep pace
with inflation and do not fluctuate as widely as does the value of other
investments. Housing is also a very widespread and familiar
investment. It requires relatively little financial sophistication to
save through the ownership of a house. Finally, in rapidly urbanizing
countries housing has historically had a high and stable rate of
return. In economies with fewer attractive investment options for
households, the role of housing in accumulating and maintaining net
worth is likely to be considerable.
A. The Apparent Inability to Mobilize Household Savings
16. The role of housing and real estate in the Korean economy has
been particularly prominent during the 1960s and the 1970s, but it was
often misunderstood. There was much concern at the time about the low
level of private savings and official alarm that such saving was
directed to "socially unproductive investments".
17. A few economists strongly argued in the 1970s that two major
factors were at work to make the private savings performance and the
urban situation both more difficult. First, private savings were
"deflected" by repressive financial policies into capital gains on land
and other quasi-fixed factors and these gains were very large given the
very fast growth of the economy. Second, Korean macro-economic policies
also lowered the effective private rate of return on investment.
18. Jeffrey Williamson was one of those who articulated this point
most effectively. He used the word "deflected savings" to stress that
economic policies were having effects opposite to the intent of policy
markers. Actually, from a portfolio analysis viewpoint there was no
deflection. Public policies which were taxing heavily the holding of
financial assets were inducing a reallocation of wealth portfolio
-9-
components. The real estate market in Korea had becomw a substitute for
the equity market and the holding of financial assets.-
19. It was pointed out that macro-economic policies may ave served
to raise land values above what they would have been in the absence of
such distortions. However, because of the almost total separation of
policy formulation into "macro-economic policies" and "physical planning
policies" there was little receptivity to such analyses. Policy makers
continued to take a "partial equilibrium" approach to what is a "general
equilibrium" prublem. Economic planners became even more determined not
to fuel what they saw as "socially wasteful speculation" by not allowing
the expansion of the housing finance system. Physical planners
stiffened their resolve to prevent the "destruction" of prime
agricultural land or open-space and tightened the land-use laws.
20. Analyses of national accounts for the late 1960s and early
1960s showed that the total domestic marginal savings rate was dominated
by the margir.al public savings ratt. which was about 24 percent, while
the marginal private savings rate was only 14 percent (Williamson,
1976). But it is well known that conventional national accounts ignore
capital gains and only measure the accumulation of assets. In other
words, national accounts measured only the cash-flow effects of policies
and not their impact on the balance-sheet of various sectors, in this
case households. From the household viewpoint, the reality is that the
saving objective is to increase the stock of private assets to the
desired relationship to current income. When income rises very rapidly
as was the case in Korea, the desired level of wealth can be raised
through the accumulation of new assets, the increase in the price of
existing assets, or both.
21. The stock of assets has two components: land or real estate R
of price Pr, and conventional capital K of current price Pk. The stock
of land R being fixed (dR = 0), current saving which is simply an
increase in wealth can be described in term of current prices as:
S = dW = (R.dPr + K.dPk] + Pk.dK
[Savings]= (Capital Gains] + ["conventional" capital formation]
Dividing both sides of the equation by Y the income in current prices
will yield an "augmented" savings ratio S/Y that more correctly reflects
the behavior of private savings. When the appreciation of land and that
8/ Opposite portfolio shifts took place following the structural
adjustment policies of the early 1980s and a clear reverse
substitution between housing and the stock market took place.
There is no empirical evidence at present, but one could expect
that the early 1980 shifts were dominated by upper income groups
but included also the emerging middle-class unable to finance
housing for lack of mortgage finance.
- 10 -
of residential structures is taken into account, the Korean
conventional private domestic saving rate is essentially doubled for the
period 1963-76 (Williamson, 1977).
B. Dominance of Real Estate in Korean Household Portfolios
22. Land has represented a very large part of Korean national
private wealth. According to the unpublished National Wealth Survey of
1968, its share was 23 percent of total wealth including agriculture,
business and government in addition to househOds. Such a share is
considerably higher than in developed countries.-
23. What was not considered by Korean policy makers during the
1960s and 1970s was that macro-policies which lower the effective
private rate of return to other investments were driving savings into
"land speculation" and contributed to raising land values above what
they could have been otherwise. This linkage between the value of land
and the discount rate in the economy can easily be stated. Defining:
Pi = price of land ( or average land values)
r = average land rents
i = effective discount rate
land can be appraised at the net present value of an infinite stream of
rents as:
Pi = r/i
Because these variables change over time, the relationship can be
restated in rates of change as:
P= r - i
In Korea, both P1 and r* have been positive and large during the
seventies, as already reported. Generally, one can expect that land
values will increase at a lower rate if the effective discount rate
increases over time. Because government policies of the period were
driving a wedge between the effective private return and the higher
national rate they contributed to raising the rate of appreciation of
land.
9/ See the article by Angus Maddison, "Growth and Slowdown in Advanced
Capitalist Economies," Journal of Economic Literature, Spring
1937.
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24. According to thi analyses of Sang-Woo Nam and David Ortmeyer
the structure of the household wealth portfolio during the middle 1970s
was as follows:
Money 5-6 percent
Time/savings Deposits 12-14.5 percent
Bonds under 1 percent
Equities 8-11 percent
UNM (curb) Loans 0.75-2 percent
Land 40-50 percent
Dwellings 20-25 percent
Portfolio adjustments during the period were very slow because of the
underdeveloped credit markets and the high transaction costs of altering
portfolios. Figure 3 shows the behavior of the household portfolio over
the period 1964-1975. Real estate assets make up over 70 percent of
household wealth during the period, see Figure 3. The share of housing
and real estate assets matches the shifts in financial policies which
are reflected in the ratio M2/GNP of Figure 1.
Figure 3
KOREA: HOUSEHOLD PORTFOLIO
1964 - 1975
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IV. PRIVATE SUBSTITUTES FOR DEFICIENT BANKINC SERVICES
25. Financial repression discourages households from making bank
deposits and blocks the supply of mortgage finance. In Korea, the dual
interest rate structure which developed was very sharp. Korean
households used housing assets and developed a unique form of rent, the
"chonsei" system as alternative financial claims. They also devised
complex strategies to purchase housing and break the borrowing barrier
of a minimal supply of mortgage finance. These substitute responses are
now discussed before evaluating housing market outcomes.
A. Unregulated Markets and Dual Interest Bate Structure
26. Financial policies in Korea led to the development of a lively
unregulated financial market in parallel with financial institutions.
The dual interest rate structure between the two remains very
pronounced. The relationship between curb market rates and
institutional rates on deposits in Korea is well documented and the
interactions between institutional financial mar kets and unregulated
money markets (UMM) are now better understood.L The size of the U1M
markets has been quite large and UMM rates could be used in combination
with other rates to evaluate the opportunity cost of funds ir. Korea.
Nominal UMM rates have been very high but are declining. The margin
between UMM rates and inflation is positive as expected (Figure 4).
27. Over the period 1963-86, nominal terms UMM rates have been
three to six times higher than 3-month deposit rates, and two t',Lmes i2-
month deposit rates at regulated banks including the Korea Housing
Bank (Figure 5). These two ratios clearly indicate that firanciai
policies have created a wedge between the effective rate of return on
financial savings available to households and the true national rate of
return on capital. The policies of statilization and liberalization
initiated in the 1980s are reflected in price stability after 1981 and
the steady decline in the UMM rate. However, real UMM inDerest rates
have remained remarkably high of the order of 20 percent per annum.
B. Financial Repression and Rental Markets: the "Chonsei" System
28. The "chonsei" system is a system of key money deposits
extensively used in the rental markets of Korea. The "chonsei" payment
is not a security deposit but a financial claim which has
developed as a substitute for the financial claims that were not
provided by regulated financial institutions. "Chonsei" consists in the
payment of a large cash deposit to the landlord instead of monthly
10/ See Yung-Chul Park (1977), Cole and Park (1983, chapters 4 and
5), Van Wijnbergen (1981 and 1983).
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Figure 4
KOREA: CURB MARKET RATES, 1963-86
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70…-
o
~~~~~~~Fg r 50
40
30
20
-~~~~~~~~~~Itr Roe'06S a
1 . .. I. .0. .
1963 S 965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 18 81 1963 1365
Source: BOX Surve2U
- UMM Market Rot* 4. Inflotion Raote
Figure 5
KOREA: DUAL INTEREST RATE STRUCTURE
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rental payments. This cash deposit can be increased by the landlord
during tenancy and must be refunded in its entirety by the landlord when
the tenant vacates the dwelling. The interest foregone by the renter is
expected to cover the implicit rental value of the dwelling. Instead of
raising rents when the rental market becomes tigp, or operating costs
increase, landlord increase the amount of chonsei.-
29. This pervasive practice developed spontaneously in response to
earlier economic and financial market conditions when inflation was
high, regulated interest rates were negative. Urban housing was in
extremely short supply due to the destruction of the housing stock
during the war and to high rates of urbanization. Chonsei is the most
conspicuous aspect of the financial repression imposed on the household
sector in Korea. The financial magnitudes involved in this housing-
related financial claim are very large both for an individual tenant and
in comparison with the institutional housing finance system.
30. Household surveys in the mid-1980s show that chonsei
represents a very high share of the capital cost or market value of the
rented space or unit. Typical chonsei ratios range between 35 percent
and 40 percent of unit market value, these ratios are higher in large
cities. For modern apartment units they can go as high as 70 percent of
the unit's value. Thus the financial claim can be startlingly large.
For instance, the Office of National Tax Administration (ONTA) reported
in 1987 that a Hyundai apartment in Apkujong-dong a quality district of
Seoul was posted at 243 million won for tax purposes, or 3 million per
pyong (one pyong is 3.? m2). For a typical 55-pyong Hyundai apartment
the Chonsei deposit can therefore vary between US$75,000 and US$133,000
when per capita income in Korea was $2,800. Because, it is not often
possible to accumulate such contracts exist such as partial or declining
chonsei, which large financial savings for housing, various forms of
rental include blends of cash deposits and monthly payments. Such large
financial claims also explain why room rentals and dwelling sharing are
so common.
31. As a market, chonsei is considerably larger than the
outstanding bank lending for housing. The chonsei system was estimated
on the basis of simple ratios to be about 5.5 times larger than the
housing finance system in 1980. The results of the KRIHS survey of
household assets also indicate that chonsei funds used in the purchased
of housing were five to six times larger that the volume of mortgage
lending provided by KHB in (see Table 2).
32. As a savings instrument, chonsei reflects the poor quality or
absence of household-oriented financial claims generated by the
regulated financial sector. On one hand, the tenants build financial
assets with the periodic increase in the deposit amount, generally every
six months. They receive a real rate of return on these financiai asset
which is positive but in kind in the form of housing services. This
return has been found to stay close to the UMM interest rate. Tenants
rent less space than they would under a monthly rent system.
ll/ See Renaud (1985) and World Bank (1986).
Table 2: Korea: Sources of Funds for Housing Purchase by Househotd Incoa Leel for All Households, 1966.
.................. ,i........ i.......................................................................................................................................
: SALE OF RETURINED SAVIuGS KE SALE kIl FORMAL It K D IM CIOISEI ASSISTAIUCE WORK OTERS IOTAL
:NH INCCIE\ PREVIOtUS CHONSEI SECWRITIES REAL LOUN LOAN PLACE RKET DEPOSIT FRON PARENT PLACE
:10,000 Wm\ HIOUSE DEPOSIT ESTATE LOUN LOAN FRON RENTER OR RELATIVE GRANTS
* (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (a) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
....................................................................................................................................................................
1-10 11.9 23.9 31.3 6.0 1.5 4.5 0.0 0.0 6.0 3.0 3.0 1.5 7.4: 100.00
11-20 11.9 23.5 27.7 8.9 5.6 2.6 1.0 0.3 6.9 1.7 5.6 0.3 3.7 100.00
21-30 * 8.6 26.3 28.8 8.1 3.7 1.8 1.8 0.4 4.7 4.6 7.8 0.4 3.0 100.00
31-40 10.5 22.5 29.3 8.9 2.6 2.5 2.8 1.4 5.4 4.5 7.3 0.2 2.1 100.00
41-50 12.7 18.9 29.5 9.4 2.9 3.8 2.6 1.3 4.9 5.3 5.8 0.2 2.7 100.00 \'
51-70 14.2 15.5 26.4 8.3 3.0 4.9 3.9 0.6 5.0 6.3 7.1 0.2 2.6 l1 O.0 :
71-100 * 18.3 13.0 26.5 7.4 3.8 8.6 2.4 1.1 4- 6.2 6.4 0.3 1.9 100.00
:over 100 * 23.9 7.1 29.5 6.7 4.5 3.4 6.3 0.4 2.6 7.1 6.0 1.2 1.3 * 100.00
.......... .................. .................................................... ........................................................................................ 
-------... ------------................................... 
Source: Research an Policies to Strengthen the Housing Finance System.
Interim Report. Dec. 1986, Based on Neu IRINS Survey. P. 69.
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33. As a source of funds, chonsei typifies the value of housing as
a collateral. However, instead of borrowing from a bank against this
collateral, the owner is extracting a loan from his tenant (or
tenants). In terms of bargaining power, the lack of adequate housing
finance and the scarcity of housing favor landlords. With chonsei,
tenants assume all default risk since the landlord receives the total
deposit in advance. On the other hand, the imputed rents tend to be
competitively priced and reflect the cost of capital on the curb (UMM)
markets. The chonsei system may be widespread but it is not financially
efficient either for the landlord or the tenant compared to the
possibilities offered by financial institutions under liberalization of
the financial system.
C. Financial Strategies to Achieve Housing Ownership
1. Sources of Funds for Housing Purchases: Overview
34. The 1986 KRIHS survey of household assets directed by Kyu-Bang
Lee provides the first reliable view of general housing finance
conditions in Korea. Table 2, originally published by KRIHS, reports
the share of the total funds used to finance housing by 13 household
income groups. This table shows how regressive the present housing
finance system is, with the lowest income categories relying the most
extensively on costly and short-term informal sources: kye (rotating
credit associations), curb market loans, and chonsei from renting out
part of the unit. Lower income households also have little access to
loans from their work place or other institutions, unspecified sources
are also large. The minimal role of the housing bank is also clear: as
much financing comes from direct chonsei rental (column 10) asfrom KHB
loans (column 6). Tne total volume of chonsei claims is of course
greater (see columns 2 and 10).
2. Households Receiving Partial Bank Financing
35. The lack of mortgage lending in Korea forces households into
complex funding strategies as shown by the annual surveys of units
partially financed by the Korea Housing Bank. This subset
covers a more fortunate minority of home buyers. Table 3 ranks in order
of frequenjc, the most common strategies currently used by Korean
households.- There are for these borrowers eight major sources of
12/ These tables were prepared from the 1985 KHB Survey at my request
by Jae-Hye Han. Ms. Han has recently completed an analysis of
the Korean tenure choice which draws on a variety of recent
housing surveys. See Jae-Hye HAN, (1987). The present
analysis was suggested by French surveys of household wealth and
mortgage borrowers, the French market being subjected to
financial repression and a scarcity of mortgage funds until the
early 1970s.
Table 3: Korea: Strategins Followed by NoVA*botd to PLurchase NousiIU; Att IIouseholdB.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (a) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Sael of Returnad Finmncial Assistanee Loan from Cbornei ftaq4"hCy Nossehold Price of Amomt of- Loan-to- P'rice /Strategies Kal Loan Prey. Chomei Ssvins from Parat Financisl from ............ cm StiicturmONaIi Value, (1) Incia(YrNoun oeposit or Relative Instituion Raenter Others U I (WenM (W) (MM ((an NM) (Wean)
I*;0 0*S 94.5317 19.24 52.20 2,147.15 1,551.09 30.08 3.89(30.08) (28.39) (41.53) 23.0
2 182 a 3150si 19.A1 58.83 2.607.45 1,969.20 25.86 4.37(25.86) 1T4.14) 22.9
* a a 304~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S 18.45 60.18 2,890.42 2,260.15 23.44 4.633 630.26 1 554.47 705.68(23.44) 452.?) (23.86) 22.13
* 9;9 a M 97 5.89 62.19 2,280.42 1,683.S2 29.61 3.69(29.61) 170.39) 7.06
a a a a~~~~ ~~~~ 66 4.00 43.55 2,405.b5 1,908.94 28.08 5.515 696.21 433.94 1.046.36 428.64(28.06) (17.25) 438.63) (16.04) 4.8
a a a a ~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~65 3.94 52.65 2,565.57 1,961.72 25.61 4.756 583.85 632.69 321.95 527.08(25.61) (23.66) (30.6) (20.13 ) 4.7
C 1.S W10 a.4 aU2 64 3.681 53.11 3,651.25 2,938.75 21.74 6.43 
(21.74) 446.03) (20.24) (11.99) 4.6
a 0;0 63aS a4.4 a0 41 2.49 53.22 2,469.02 1,869.02 25.96 4.52 -4(28.64) (25.86) (28.87) (19.31) 2g 
a ~ 3 a2.9 a?7 32 1.94 42.75 2,449.03 1,803.72 29.05 5.34(29.05) (37.05) (33.9 ) 2.33
a a a a ~ ~~~ ~ 25 1.52 52.76 2,344.30 1,704.80 28.64 4.1910 640.00 445.20 712.40 547.2(28.64) (19.78) (29.18) (22.4) 1.82
a a 6.I a C o24 1.46 61.04 3,277350 2,669.17 19.06 5.02(1906 449.22) (16.99) (14.74) 1.75
a a C ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~24 1.4 iZi 56.33 ,706.3 2,26.08 -- 21-.05S- -- 4'.58-12 531.25 1 486.67 78042 (21.05) 451.58) (27371) 1.5 
Source: KMl, Survey of tile Nouing tIMits Fi byd tue KW.l 1965. 1,34 8.36
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funds: KHB loans, capital gains from the sale an earlier house, the
return of a chonsei deposit, financial savings, assistance for
relatives, loans frobi other financial institutions (not necessarily
second mortgage loans), the chonsei deposit coming from a tenant, and
other sources. The income of the borrower, the price of the unit and
the ratio of housing price to household income show the link between a
strategy and who uses it. There is a clear difference between first-
time buyers and borrowers who sold an earlier home.
36. Over 28 strategies were actually ir. use in 1985; the 12 most
frequent covering 83.5 percent of sample borrowers are presented in
Table 3. The data clearly show the inefficient and fragmented methods
of financing housing. KHB loan-to-value (LTV) ratios are very low and
consistently below 30 percent. This defeats the first-time ownership
objective of KHB: less than half the borrowers were first time owners.
This lending strategy reflects the monopolistl.- fosition of KHB, its
public status, and its lack of funds. KHE's n.&formance is judged
according to the number of loans it makes. Besides, low LTV ratios
minimize default risk and eliminate the need for income tests, thereby
greatly reducing administrative costs.
37. Among the 47 percent of the borrowers who were first time
home-owners, the majority (49 percent) relied on their previous chonsei
deposit and other financial assets. The chonsei deposit provided 28
percent of the funds. Those with lower incomes had to sublet part of
their unit to finance their unit, their house/income ratio was the
highest in the group at 5.5 times. This confirms that chonsei renters
are used in the case of high housing price/income ratios. The general
survey of the Korean population and the surveys of KHB borrowers clearly
show the large degree of fragmentation and inefficiency which could be
eliminated by the financial liberalization of housing finance and the
effective development of a mortgage market.
V. COMPOUNDING FINANCIAL REPRESSION WITH RIGID LAND REGULATIONS
38. Korea is one of the three economies with the highest
population densities in the world, the other two being Taiwan and
Bangladesh. Therefore some would argue that one should not be surprised
to find that the ratio of the value of a unit to the income of the
household is high. Also, were not the high rates of return in the land
market caused by the extremely fast pace of growth of the urban
population and the rapid rise of household incomes? The empirical
evidence supports the view that rapid land appreciation was caused by
more than rapid urbanization and the scarcity of urban land in Korea.
This evidence is that land use policies have compounded the effects of
financial repression, restricted the supply of housing, helped raise
rents and thus accelerated the rise of the relative price of housing
compared to household incomes.
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39. Three types of physical planning policies have restricted the
supply of land. First, there have been strong zoning policies to
restrict land-use conversion, especially of rice paddy land, when in
fact the productivity of land in urban use was found consistently
superior to farm use at the city margin (see Hanratty, 1977). Second,
the use of a green belt policy which when marginally relaxed could
increase urban welfare (see Kyung-Hwan Kim, 1987). And third, the land
readjustment methods which relies on the large differential between the
price of serviced land and the price of raw (often a seven to eight-fold
increase) linked to monopolistic administrative practices to finance
urban investment (see William Doebele, 1982).
40. Various analyses of the structure of housing demand in Korea
have shown that it is price inelastic, but that its income elasticity is
much greater. A study confirms that housing supply has been markedly
more price inelastic in Korea than in developed countries like the U.S.
or Canada (see Chung, 1985). The net effect has been that the value of
the housing stock has become higher than it would have been in the
absence of distorting policies. There can therefore be an increasing
gap between the money amount of housing investment and the increase in
the quality of the physical standards that lies behind it.
41. To show that it is not physical density alone but policies
which affect the price of urban land in Korea, Ingram (1980) used a
production function framework to look at the rise of factor payment as a
proportion of output in farm use and urban use. To make this point
Ingram compared Korea with one of the most land abundant country, the
United States. Korea's gross population density is about sixteen times
higher than in the United States. In the late 1970s, four percent of
the national land area was classified as urban, but over 80 percent was
occupied by agriculture or forests. Land in urban residential use
accounted for 38 percent of Korea's total land value but only 0.5
percent of Korea's total land area.
42. Factor payment shares in the agricultural sector were very
similar between the United Statea and Korea in spite of the huge
difference of 300 to one in factor proportions of land to labor between
the two countries. On the other hand in the non-agricultural sector the
ratio of land value to product in Korea is twice that of the United
States. The ratios of agricultural land value to agricultural product
value were 5.4 in the U.S. in 1970 and 4.2 in Korea in 1975. The ratios
of non-agricultural land value to non-agricultural output were 0.62 in
the U.S. and 1.2 in Korea. Similarly, in Korea "over the entire period
1963-1974 land values in the twelve major cities grew more rapidly than
did the value of non-agricultural output", (Ingram, p.108).
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VI. CONSEQUEWNCS OF FINANCIAL REPRESSION AND URBAN REGULATIONS
43. The present system of housing finance in combination with
physical planning policies raises two kinds of questions regarding their
distorting impacts on the housing sector. First, has there been
intersectoral resource mis-allocation with under-investment in
housing? Second, within the housing sector did financial repression
lead to a regressive pattern of housing production and increasing
inequtality in wealth distribution and housing consumption?
A. User-cost of Housing and Investment Market Disequilibrium
44. As noted, the ratio of housing prices to household incomes is
high in Korea, of the order of 5 and rising (see Table 3, column 14).
However, housing investment disequilibrium can not be inferred directly
from the level of ratio or even its trend. A determination that there
is under-investment in housing can be made if the cost of capital in
housing is considexably higher than the cost of capital in other uses.
Such a capital cost difference would signal that policy rationing is
preventing an efficient intersectoral allocation of capital between
sectors. The user cost of capital in housing can be defined by the
relationi2':
C = [i + t + m + d - ep].ph
where:
C = user cost of housing
i = nominal interest rate
t = real estate tax rate
m = maintenance cost
d = rate of housing capital depreciation
ep= expected rate of capital gains adjusted for taxes
ph= the purchase price of housing
13/ See the analyses of Follain, Hendershott and Van Order in the
case of the United States. Recently, Mills has raised the
opposite question of over-investment in housing in the case of
the United States, see Mills (1987).
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45. Under-investment in housing exists when the user cost of
capital in housing'is significantly higher than the user cost of capital
in the rest of the economy. This would indicate that policies are
preventing a balanced flow of resources across sectors. The working
hypothesis is that there are two main factors raising the user cost of
capital in the housing sector above the opportunity cost of capital in
the economy. First, Lhe interest rate on private financing reflected by
curb or unregulated market interest rates (UMM) which more than
compensates for the high rate of net capital gains. Second, the
relative price of housing whose value has been raised by financial
policies, land policies as well as high transaction costs which include
large transfer taxes. So far in Korea, property taxes and other forms
of user taxes are not high by international standards. Maintenance
costs and rates of depreciation are not known to be especially high and
tend to balance each other out.
46. What was a likely outcome when the paper was originally
written has been confirmed by the recent work of Kyung-Hwan Kim
(1987). He estimated that small changes in green belt boudaries for
Seoul (by one kilometer) would increase developable land by about 14
percent and lead to a 2.7 percent decrease in housing prices; the
elasticity of housing prices with respect to land supply being estimated
at -0.2.
47. Similarly, Kim could show that policies were preventing the
flow of funds into housing. Using a housing market survey for Korean
cities of 1982 he found that the estimated real rate of return to
housing was on the order of 8 percent for single family units and 12
percent for multi-family units. These rates considerably exceeded
annual average real rate of return on corporate bonds of 5.1 percent by
3 to 8 percentage points.14/
B. Skewed Size Distribution of New Housing Output
48. Two convergent forces lead to a skewed size distribution of
output in favor of larg= units. First, in most countries, the top
income deciles of households control a very high share of total
assets. In the absence of financial repression and with well developed
equity markets their wealth will be diversified into a variety of
financial and real assets. Under financial repression they favor real
estate assets and acquire the largest units possible. Second, under
rapidly rising incomes the other households would like to buy adequate
14/ There may be questions about the accuracy with which corporate
bonds reflect the exact opportunity cost of capital in the Korean
economy. However, there is agreement that this is the best
indicator, see Dornbush and Yung-Chul Park (1987).
- 22 -
units. A full cash transaction being impossible, in the absence of
mortgage loan they achieve divisibility by acquiring large units and
subletting part of it.
49. Comparisons between the size distribution of income and the
size-distribution of hoasing units indicate that the output of new
housing units is indeed skewed and contains a large share of big
units. The Korean share of housing investment in GNP is not
particularly low, but the number of new units per thousand households is
low. Making a parallel with West-Germany during the postwar period, the
size of new Korean units was more than 20 percent larger than in Germany
in spite of the fact thgy Korean per capita incomes were only a third or
less of German income.
C. Asset-Based Housing Purchases and Accentuated Housing Cycles
50. Because of the lack of mortgage financing, the acquisition of
a new unit is heavily dependent on the sale of existing units. This
asset-based financing accentuates boom-and-bust cycles, and renders the
housing sector very sensitive to changes in the level of liquidity in
the economy. The close correlation between changes in Ml and in new
housing is very clear in Figure 6. Also, whiLe there has been a clear
upward trend in the share of housing investment in annual GNP, as should
be expected, year-to-year fluctuations have been very pronounced I (see
Figure 7). Econometric analyses by Chung (1985) confirm these strong
cycles.
51. The lack of mortgage finance in the housing market increases
the dominance of the capital gains aspects of housing over the imputed
rental value of a unit. When the stock market began to develop in the
early 1980s and inflation fell below 3 percent, wealthy households that
were already owners shifted their interest to financial equities. This
was reflected in the drop in the average price of houses in major cities
by 2.8 percent between December 1985 and December 1986. Confirming the
long-term asset demand for occupancy of the remaining households (as
opposed to short-term investment), KHB reported that the strongest
demand is for middle size units. The average price for units over 40
pyong and for less than 25 pyong (3.3 m2) was softening while that for
26 to 39 pyong remained steady.
D. Shortage of Units and Decline of the "Housing Supply Ratio"
52. The rental market is regressive in Korea because the ability
to rent is based on accumulated wealth and not on current earning
power. The very high ratio of chonsei to the market value of the unit
rented explains why housing units are so often shared and the very poor
15/ After adjustment for purchasing power parity using the Kravis et
al system for international comparisons of gross product and
purchasing power. See World Bank (1978), Chapter 3.
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Figure 6
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ratio between housing units and the number of households in cities, as
shown in Figure 8. Note the correlation between periods of severe
financial repression and a fall in the supply ratio (compare with
Table 1).
53. As slready seen, tenants are required to provide large lump-
sum payments which are about equal to one year of their salary. Most
young renters without accumulated savings (or affluent parents) cannot
afford to rent a full unit but must sublet part of a unit from others.
Monthly rents are associated with low-income status until now. Korean
surveys show that multiple renters are more frequent when income is
lower because of limited chonsei savings. Crowding at the low-income
end of the market is very severe. In the 1980 census, only 30 percent
of urban households occupied an entire unit, while 30 percent shared it
with one other family, 18 percent with two and 22 percent with three or
more households in a single unit (see 1980 Census, Table 7).
54. Analyses of the censuses over time show that the low value of
the "supply ratio" in cities graphed in Figure 8 is also linked to two
other factors: the removal of a large number of small units or their
enlargement. The enlargement of small units is again linked to the
scarcity of financing which leaves room only for an incremental approach
to housing investment. Apartment units do not lend themselves to such
enlargement; this is another reason why the lack of mortgage finance
increasingly distorts the supply of new housing in Korea.
E. Rapidly Rising Real Rents
55. The lack of mortgage financing for new housing construction is
reflected also in continuing rise of real rents with rental charges
rising by 5.3 percent in 1986; this incryg7e is twice the CPI rise of
only 2.6 percent during the same period. - Long-term series on real
rent increases remain to be developed.
VII. CONCLUSION
56. The findings for Korea confirm the hypothesis that the nature
of economic planning and financial policies not only play significant
roles in explaining the performance of the housing sector, but is likely
to have a greater impact than other variables such as the level of per
capita income or the degree of urbanization, (see Renaud and Buckley,
1987). For a long period of time, Korea has shown the features of non-
performing housing finance systems under policies of strong directed
credit and alternating phases of mild and strong financial repression.
16/ KHB press release March 6, 1987.
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Figure 8
KOREA: HOUSING UNITS PER HOUSEHOLD
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57. With the achievement of price stability and pursuit offinancial liberalization, the financial markets are at a threshold interms of housing finance policies. There are major opportunities for alarge, decentralized and efficient mortgage market for the first time.analyses of the new flow-of-funds data which separate the household
sector from the non-incorporated business sector shows the strong growthof household net financial assets which have more than doubled in fiveyears under stable prices. Confirming the very slow decline of the
"orepression ratio" between UMM rates and banking rates, households have
stayed away from monetary (or deposit) institutions and favored theinvestment and finance companies. Life insurance has grown very
rapidly. The demand for long-term assets is growing.
58. What the housing market least needs is increased governmentintervention. Housing finance liberalization and the rapid expansion ofthe mortgage market should contribute powerfully to the rapid demise ofthe chonsei which has outlived its usefulness and has such negative
effects on the rental markets. The pursuit of public policies based onthe fragmented thinking which has characterized past directed creditpolicies should be changed. For instance,, recent proposals for largepublic rental programs ignore the large benefits of genuine housingfinance reforms and'should be integrated with them. Similarly, there isample reason to review the intent and effects of physical planning
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regulations. Price stability and housing finance liberalization can
then be expected to have favorable equity effects.
59. Finally, while the evidence is that there has been under-
investment in housing in Korea, this does not mean that urbanization in
Korea has taken place in a had way. The urban performance of Korea
remains remarkable: it has absorbed large populations quickly and at
improving standards. In addition, a total look at overall national
economic growth is needed to determine what alternative intersectoral
allocation patterns might have been feasible and maintain East Asian
style high growth. Is under-investment in the urban sector the price to
be paid for achieving high growth rates? This paper could only raise
the issue. Asian cross-country comparisons should also be valuable. On
the other hand, there is no doubt that financial stability and an
efficient mortgage finance system will greatly improve the inter-
sectoral allocation of resources and achieve greater equity.
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